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Abstract
Cooperative undertakings account for a substantial share of developed market economies
and that share is likely to grow with the advent of the new economy. The paper develops
a dynamic investment framework that relates access policies, financing and growth of co-
operatives. It shows how discriminating among users affects the viability of cooperatives
and impacts social efficiency. It then argues that in most circumstances, the cooperative
form, even when viable on a stand-alone basis, is a weak competitor against alternative
organizational forms. Last, the paper stresses that access policies involve a standard social
tradeoff between static efficiency and innovation.
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1 Introduction
Cooperative undertakings account for a substantial share of developed market economies. As
documented by Hansmann (1996), even in the United States cooperatives dominate or at least
figure prominently in a number of industries, such as agriculture,1 credit cards, hardware, mov-
ing companies, electricity and the financial sector. Related forms of cooperative undertakings
include joint ventures (R&D joint ventures, Intelsat, airline seat reservation systems), consortia
(undersea fiber optic cable systems), and partnerships (law firms, investment banks). Cooper-
atives may become even more prominent with the advent of the new economy. For example, an
important question confronting firms and antitrust authorities is whether standards and B2B
exchanges should be controlled by a single user, or by a community of users, whose extent then
∗The authors are grateful to Drew Fudenberg, Joshua Gans, Henri Hansmann and an anonymous referee for
helpful discussions and comments.
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1For example, cooperatives market 32% of the products produced and processed in the agri-food chain.
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has to be defined. Another case in point is patent pools,2 which have played a crucial role in
the aerospace and automobile industries as well as in a number of other industries.3
The existence of cooperative undertakings can usually be traced to two forms of returns
to scale in the provision of an input and to the concomitant eagerness of the users to protect
themselves from monopoly behavior. First, returns to scale may be associated with large fixed
costs. As Hansmann (1996, 1999) argues, the capital intensity of equipment manufacturing
is often and incorrectly thought of as an important barrier to the emergence of cooperatives.
For example, some of the largest farm supply cooperatives in the US run very capital-intensive
operations (oil refining, seeds, fertilizers, ...); credit card cooperatives involve substantial sunk
investment in telecommunications networks, software and branding. Because they are shared
among the users, fixed costs in cooperatives give rise to “cost-sharing network externalities”.
The second form of returns to scale relates to “classical network externalities”. Such network
externalities arise for example for credit cards, moving companies, flower delivery services or
alliances around a standard.
This paper focuses on the financing of cooperatives: How do cooperatives manage their
financing and growth? Do they have the proper investment incentives? When are they viable?
Cooperatives rely primarily on the proportional assessments levied on their members’ usage of
the facilities (the “unit retains” that are kept after patronage dividends are redistributed to the
members) and equity investments by the members. They by and large have little or no access
to external finance.4
2See Merges (1996) for an overview of these pools, as well as those related to collective rights organizations
(such as the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers), Shapiro (2001) for a discussion of pools
in the context of semiconductors and standard setting, and Lerner-Tirole (2004) for theoretical modelling of
pool formation and characteristics.
3Well-known patent pools in the new economy include the MPEG LA pool (protocol for compressing and
transmitting digitalized audio and video signals) and the former Cylink-RSA public key encryption pool that
for a while defined a de facto proprietary standard. Still, patent pools have not yet had the impact on the new
economy that might be expected from the observation that software, semiconductor and biotechnology products
potentially infringe on thousands of intellectual property rights, so that pooling would ceteris paribus appear
very desirable. Moreover, when pooling occurs it often takes the more limited form of cross licensing. Industry
participants’ concerns about how the pool will evolve and antitrust authorities’ fear of improper use of pools to
collude or erect barriers to entry may account for this currently low diffusion of pools.
4There are literal exceptions to this characterization. In the US tax-exempt nonprofit hospitals have been able
(until the 1986 Tax Reform Act) to borrow to help cover substantial capital investments. But such cooperatives
had access to collateral (relatively safe income streams, building, brandname) and, as we said, benefited from
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The viability of cooperatives and their investment incentives are closely related to the coop-
eratives’ access policies. Some cooperatives essentially do not discriminate between incumbents
and new or expanding members. Most however practice such discrimination in various ways.
Usage fees may decrease with past cumulative usage,5 or may depend on the user’s status (e.g.,
internal vs external in a patent pool). Cooperatives may ask for entry fees6 or may allow older
members to redeem their shares when they depart.7 And many of the “new generation” US
farm cooperatives issue transferable and appreciable equity shares, which enable incumbents to
recoup some of their investment when departing the venture (Cook-Iliopoulos 1999).
Access policies matter for both business and antitrust reasons. Liberal access policies allow
new members to free-ride on previous investments; as we will see, such policies may prevent the
venture from getting off the ground and they further encourage short-termism in investment
decisions (an issue known as the “horizon problem” in the policy literature). At the other end
of the spectrum, very restrictive access policies raise two concerns. First, they may excessively
tax newcomers and make the venture underinclusive. Second, when the members compete on
the product market, access policies may be used as a barrier to entry. Access policies therefore
must strike the right balance between the protection of investment and openness.
To the best of our knowledge, there has been no analytical treatment of the issues covered
in this paper. The theoretical literature on cooperatives8 focuses on corporate governance and
borrowing subsidies. The fact that many of these hospitals had trouble raising funds to cover their investment
needs and converted to for-profit status in the 90’s confirms the low access of cooperatives to external financing.
5See, e.g. Hansmann (1996) and Rathbone-Wissman (1993). For example, under a per-unit capital returns
system, new members or members who increase their consumption must make new investments to reach a target
capital-patronage ratio. Redemption programs include first-in, first-out redemptions, base capital methods (re-
deeming overinvested patrons), and percent-of-all-equities programs (redemptions proportional to outstanding
equities).
6For example, the Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation (MCC), a large-scale IT project
involving 21 participants had an entry fee of $150,000 at the onset (1983). Newcomers paid a $1,000,000 entry
fee in 1986.
7Although, as noted by Hansmann (1999), redemptions are not as widespread as one might have expected.
Rathbone and Wissman (1993), in their study of the various forms of redemption in agricultural coooperatives,
document “special equity redemption programs,” that redeem equity to existing members (in agriculture, exit
from a cooperative is probably less subject to opportunistic behavior than in other industries). Common
programs include payments to a member’s estate after her death, age-of-patron / retirement programs, and
disability programms. As one would expect, there are fewer retirement-from-farming or move-away programs.
8E.g., Glaeser-Shleifer (2001), Kremer (1997), Hart-Moore (1996,1998) and Rey-Tirole (2001).
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conflict issues and is not cast in a dynamic investment framework. We will however point at
some links between our work and two apparently distinct fields: the political economy of social
security reform and public utility regulation.
The paper develops a simple overlapping-generations (OLG) framework in order to capture
the intergenerational conflicts between incumbents and new members. Investments are financed
from assessments or from equity contributions levied from current members. Our study proceeds
in a gradual manner in order to identify in a clean way the relevant trade-offs. It focuses first on
the intergenerational conflicts by ignoring downstream competition. That is, the members of
the cooperative interact only through their membership. In this framework we ask three groups
of questions: When are cooperatives viable and how is their investment affected by the absence
of discrimination (section 2)? Are cooperatives robust to competition from other cooperatives,
discriminatory or non-discriminatory, and from for-profit companies, and how do cooperatives
emerge in an environment in which alternative institutional forms are available (section 3)? Are
cooperatives over or underinclusive and should the level of discrimination between old and new
users vary over time (section 4)? The analysis is then generalized to allow membership value to
be eroded by the entry of new, competing members and the paper studies the anticompetitive
concerns associated with alternative access policies (section 5). Last, section 6 concludes.
2 Are cooperatives viable?
2.1 Model
To model the arrival of new agents/potential users and study access policies, we consider an
OLG framework.9 Time is discrete, and the horizon infinite, t = 0, 1, 2, · · · . Agents live for two
consecutive periods. Each period, a generation with a large number, namely a continuum of
mass 1, of agents is born, and an equal-size generation exits. The discount factor is denoted by
9The OLG model is a standard, Samuelsonian one. It is easy to generalize our results using, say, a Blanchard
(1985) framework, in which agents’ retirement follows a Poisson process. Similarly, the extension to time-
dependent populations (n0 , n1, ..., nt...) is completely straightforward. It predicts a slower transition to the
steady state than depicted here if the sequence nt is increasing. It can also be used to study the mirror image
of a declining membership.
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δ < 1.
At each date t− 1, an investment, costing I > 0 if incurred, is available, that brings about
a technology for date t. This technology generates gross surplus θ for any agent who has access
at t to the technology. This surplus can be thought of as the user’s surplus increment relative
to publicly available technologies at date t. The technology is a public good in that its ex post
marginal cost is zero10 and furthermore the individual gross surplus θ is independent of the
number of agents who have access to the technology at t. Our formulation also implies that
agents do not compete on the product market; otherwise, the individual surplus would depend
on the access policy. As discussed in the introduction, we want to separate intergenerational
conflicts from competitive issues and therefore delay the introduction of product market com-
petition. Agents are risk neutral and do not face credit constraints. We will further assume
that the investment is socially beneficial.
This section assumes that all agents have the same gross surplus θ from having access to
the technology. [Section 4 will consider the case of within-generation heterogeneity and will
look at inclusiveness.] The condition that the investment is socially beneficial is then:
2δθ > I. (1)
We will analyze the following institutions:
Investor owned corporation (IOC). The investor owned corporation is externally financed. Pro-
vided it has invested at date t− 1, the IOC rents/licenses its technology at access charge at at
date t.
Nondiscriminatory cooperative (NDC). The nondiscriminatory cooperative is the purest form
of cooperative: There is no entry fee, no redemption rights and all users of the cooperative at a
given date t pay the same amount at for the right to use the input produced by the cooperative.
We assume that control rights over the investment decision in a cooperative (discriminatory or
not) are allocated to the young members — otherwise investment would never take place.
10Throughout the analysis, we focus on investment costs and ignore variable operating costs. In practice,
the access charge at should be interpreted as the amount that needs to be added to variable costs in order to
recover the fixed costs of investment.
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Fully discriminatory cooperative (FDC). In a discriminatory cooperative, new members do not
pay the same amount as established members. A fully discriminatory cooperative completely
disconnects the assessments paid by the established members and by the newcomers. Without
loss of generality (see below), we will formalize discrimination as the existence of an entry fee
Et to be paid by new members at date t and chosen by established members. The newcomers’
entry fee is used to defray the investment cost I. By convention, new members otherwise pay
the same usage price at as established members. [In this interpretation, the old-timers do not
receive any equity redemption payment when they leave. They benefit from the newcomers’
entry fee through the reduction in the access charge.]
We will investigate the viability and the efficiency of these organizational forms: we will say
that an organizational form is viable when the socially desirable investment is made in each
period, and that it is efficient if the technology is moreover accessible to all the users who can
benefit from it.
2.2 Viability in the absence of a competing platform
We will assume here that there is no threat of entry by a rival platform (section 3 studies
upstream competition); as we will see, even in the absence of such competition NDCs are more
fragile than the other two institutions.
• Investor-owned corporation. Provided it has invested at t− 1, the IOC sets access charge at
date t so as to capture user surplus:
at = am = θ,
and so its intertemporal profit is
V m =
2δθ − I
1− δ . (2)
Under condition (1), investment is viable in an IOC, since the latter captures the entire social
surplus under user homogeneity.
• Fully discriminatory cooperative. A fully discriminatory cooperative can also extract the new
members’ entire surplus and thus replicates the outcome of an IOC. To see this, first consider
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the steady state of an FDC and let V FDC = θ − aFDC denote the old members’ equilibrium
instantaneous payoff. In any period, the access charge is linked to the entry fee E by 2a = I−E.
The old generation optimally seeks to maximize its payoff,
θ − a = θ − I −E
2
;
it thus chooses the largest fee that the young generation is willing to pay:
E = θ − a+ δV FDC ,
and gets
V = θ − a = 2θ − I + δV FDC .
That is, the old generation extracts the entire instantaneous surplus generated by the cooper-
ative, plus the discounted rent that the young generation will get later on. In equilibrium11
V = V FDC =
2θ − I
1− δ .
The first generation (born at date 0) extracts the entire surplus and gets
UFDC0 = −I + δV FDC =
2δθ − I
1− δ = V
m,
while the later generations receive no surplus (UFDCt = 0 for t > 0). An FDC thus replicates the
outcome of an IOC: in the case of an IOC, the investor extracts the surplus from all generations
of users directly through the access charge; in the case of an FDC, the first generation uses the
entry fee to extract the surplus from the second generation, which in turn extracts the surplus
from the third one, and so on, so that in effect the first generation extracts the surplus from
all future generations, exactly as does the investor through the access charge in the case of an
IOC.
11In the steady-state, the entre fee is equal to EFDC = 1+δ1−δ (2θ − I) while the access charge, aFDC =
[I − (1 + δ) θ] / (1− δ), is negative. This access charge should however be interpreted as a reduction in the
usage fee charged for the input supplied by the cooperative, which is normalized to zero in our framework.
In addition, if the demand for the input is variable, non-linear (e.g., two-part) tariffs should be used and the
subsidy should be applied to the fixed part of the tariff in order to avoid distortions.
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• Nondiscriminatory cooperative. An NDC that gets off the ground has no trouble to keep
going since the new members free ride on the old members’ investment. To be certain, these
new members know that their successors will in turn free ride on their own investments, but
this cost is discounted. More formally, in steady state, assessments at = aNDC satisfy
2aNDC = I,
so that the net surplus of a date-t new member (t > 0) is equal to
UNDCt = U






and is positive under condition (1).
A new generation, who controls a reinvestment decision will however choose to keep the








δθ ≥ (1 + δ) I
2
, (3)
and is stronger than condition (1).
The situation is even less favorable for the first generation, so that NDCs do not easily get
started. For, that generation bears the brunt of the date-0 investment12 and gets to use the















12Date-0members may either contribute through lump-sum grants or entry fees, or else commit to an exclusive
use of the cooperative at date 0 and pay a surcharge for the use of the (public) technology.
13Note the importance of the assumption that the NDC cannot exclude. At each instant old members would
like to stop investment. They could do so by excluding new entrants or, if the membership were actually
declining, by keeping control over the board. More generally, investment in an NDC will take place only if a
controlling majority has a forward looking perspective.
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the NDC never gets started. Condition (4) is stronger than condition (3) since, unlike the
subsequent ones, the first generation that gets the cooperative going cannot shift half of the
investment burden to the previous generation. This implies that the NDC keeps going if it gets
started.
Therefore, while an FDC performs as an IOC, an NDC appears more fragile. The following
proposition summarizes this analysis:
Proposition 1 With homogenous users, an investor-owned corporation and a fully discrim-
inatory cooperative are equivalent and are both viable and efficient. The nondiscriminatory
cooperative is steady state viable and efficient, but it gets off the ground if and only if condition
(4) holds.
A few remarks are in order. First, the equivalence between investor-owned corporations
and fully-discriminatory cooperatives is quite general under user homogeneity and extends
for example to variable usage levels. In effect, the first generation in a fully discriminatory
cooperative owns the facilities and is able to impose monopoly conditions on the new members.
This exercise of monopoly power creates no welfare loss because new members are homogenous
and thus all “get on board”.
Second, we have assumed that discrimination takes the form of an entry fee levied on the
young generation and that this entry fee is used to defray the investment cost. In practice,
discrimination may take several other forms. First, the cooperative may levy seniority-based
assessments. That is, it may levy different access charges {aot , ayt } on the old and the young.
Second, the association may pay a redemption or dividend dt based on capital accounts (that
is here to the old members). Third, the members may be endowed with a transferable property
right. The exiting members then receive a (market determined) lump sum payment pt when they
leave the cooperative, which again amounts to reduce their effective usage fee. These various
instruments are formally equivalent in our simple framework: setting a higher charge for young
members (ayt > aot ) amounts to charging an entry fee Et = aot − ayt ; a transferable property
right pt reduces the effective fee charged to old members (aot = at − pt); and a redemption dt
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both reduces the usage fee of the old members (aot = at − dt) and increases that of the young
members (ayt = at + dt). We thus have:14
Observation: A fully discriminatory cooperative can implement its optimal policy by using any
of the following instruments: (i) entry fees; (ii) seniority-based assessments; (iii) redemptions
or dividends; (iv) transferable property rights.
2.3 Robustness and extensions
•Network externalities. The analysis above accounts only for cost-sharing network externalities.
It is easily generalized to allow also for more conventional network externalities. For example
suppose that a member’s gross surplus in a given period t is given by
θ + v (nt) ,
where nt is the number of date-t users of the good, and v is an increasing function. The analysis
goes through by replacing the per-member benefit θ with the “modified benefit” θ ≡ θ+ v (2) .
In particular, a for-profit owner or the founders of a fully discriminatory cooperative still
appropriate the future flows of network externalities, whereas an NDC finds it more difficult to
get started.
• Quality of investment. NDCs not only may not make socially desirable investments, but
more generally may underscale their investments. The same ideas apply to choices among
investments. Consider an inferior investment technology that costs only J < I but yields a
lower surplus γ < θ, satisfying
2δ (θ − γ) > I − J,
14In broader frameworks, these various instruments would no longer be redundant. For example, an entry fee
(paid once for all) and a redemption policy (paid in several periods) have different impacts on young members’
incentive to stay in the cooperative in the early stage of their membership. These two instruments also have
differentiated impacts on credit constrained members.
There are also two minor caveats to the equivalence demonstrated in the text. The first is that access charges
must be nonnegative; this may be a concern when entry fees are used to reduce the assessment and variable
operating costs are not very high (in the above analysis of the FDC, where operating costs are zero, in steady
state the access charge equals a∗ = (I − (1 + δ) θ) / (1− δ) and is indeed negative). Dividends or membership
rights avoid this problem as they allow assessments to remain positive. Conversely assessments should not be
so high as to discourage users. The variety of instruments however allows the cooperative to implement its
discrimination policy without striking these two rocks.
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so that adopting the superior technology is still the efficient choice.
The investor-owned corporation and the fully discriminatory cooperative fully internalize
future benefits and so choose the superior technology in each period. And as before, if a nondis-
criminatory cooperative can get started with the new superior technology, the new generations
will keep choosing the superior technology as well, since they get half of the benefits but bear
only half of the cost. But the founders of an NDC, who bear the full cost of investment and
receive only half of the benefits may now choose the inferior technology even if (4) holds; in-
deed, if the cooperative keeps investing in the superior technology once it gets started, the first
generation gets





if it founds the cooperative with the superior technology, while it gets






if it founds the cooperative with the inferior technology. Therefore, the first generation chooses




that is, whenever condition (4) holds and, in addition:15
I − J > δ (θ − γ) .
While this short-termist behavior is only transitory here — the cooperative reverts to the
superior technology once it gets going16 —, it would arise repeatedly if the cooperative were to
grow slowly over time, say because of a positive trend in the number of potential users.
15For any I and θ satisfying (4), there always exist J and γ such that 2δ (θ − γ) > I−J > δ (θ − γ); therefore,
the inferior technology may indeed be adopted even when the superior one would be both efficient and viable.
16Letting v ∈ {γ, θ} denote the surplus generated by the technology adopted in the previous period, if the
date-t generation anticipates that the next one will adopt the superior technology, it gets v − I/2 + δ (θ − I/2)
if it, too, invests in the superior technology and θ− J/2 + δmax {γ − I/2, 0} if it invests instead in the inferior




0), it prefers the superior
technology whenever 2δ (θ − γ) > I − J .
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• Control rights and financing. We assumed that cooperatives did not have access to exter-
nal finance. External finance raises several issues in the case of a cooperative. Debt finance
makes the cooperative highly sensitive to “runs” by members. In the absence of buffer, the
desertion by some members increases the assessment levied on remaining members, who then
have a strong incentive to leave. Outside equity finance does not create such snowballing. But
it (or more generally outside finance) raises control issues. Either outside equityholders have
control over the firm and then the latter is run basically as an investor-owned corporation. Or
control is granted to the users, in which case outside finance is marred by the “empty-shell syn-
drome”. In the same way the creditors of a corporation are concerned that shareholders might
distribute themselves excessive dividends and empty the firm of its value, outside financiers
of a cooperative are preoccupied with the possibility that the profit potential be syphoned
off by the members before they can recoup their initial investment. The scope for diversion,
though, is different. Dividends received by shareholders are highly visible, so that debtholders
can and typically do impose covenants restricting dividend distribution. In contrast, members
of a cooperative can distribute themselves less verifiable “dividends” in the form of goldplated
versions of the input supplied by the cooperative.
Although our approach compares familiar institutions and is not one of optimal mechanism
design, we can shed some further light as to the limits to external financing for cooperatives.
To see why the “empty shell” syndrome may discourage external investors from financing
cooperatives where members have all the control rights over the assets, consider a simple two-
period variant of the model in which: (i) in period 1, users (the cooperative members) can
contract with outside investors on current access prices and investment decisions; (ii) in period
2, users decide over second-period access prices. In the second period, the users will set the
access price so as to cover operating costs, but have no incentives to generate extra revenue
in order to pay back external investors; anticipating this, outside investors will not lend in
period 1. This simple illustration suggests that user cooperatives will find it difficult to attract
financing without giving some control rights over pricing decisions to the investors. The risk of
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excessive “frontloading” benefits in earlier periods or of “goldplating” benefits in future periods
may similarly discourage external investors.17
3 Competition among organizational forms
Section 2 focused on the viability of alternative organizational forms. Let us now look into
the choice of organizational form. The analysis of section 2 points at two handicaps faced by
the nondiscriminatory cooperative form in its competition with alternative institutions. First,
it may not be viable. Second, even if it is viable, it is not in general in the interest of the
founders to create a nondiscriminatory cooperative: adopting instead a discriminatory charter
would allow them to capture some of the future generations’ rents. These two reasons probably
explain why most cooperatives actually discriminate.
There are however limits to discrimination. One such limit may come from antitrust en-
forcement of open access (see section 5). Another, more along the lines of section 2, is that a
commitment not to discriminate may be necessary to reassure prospective or expanding mem-
bers. We briefly explore this issue, before turning to the impact of upstream competition.
3.1 Protection against expropriation
Suppose for example that each generation t must incur some fixed investment cost c at date
t − 1 in order to be able to derive gross surplus θ from access at t and t + 1. For example,
it may make its own technology compatible with that of the platform. If the cooperative can
freely discriminate, its incumbent members will expropriate prospective members’ surplus, e.g.
by charging higher entry fees to those who have made the required investment (or through any
other discriminatory instrument). Anticipating this, prospective members do not incur the fixed
cost c, and the fully discriminatory cooperative is therefore unable to attract new members.18
17We explored this more formally in Rey and Tirole (2006) (see Appendix D). Using the simple two-period
variant just mentioned, we showed that users would indeed have excessive incentives to "frontload" the benefits
from investment, in order to reduce repayments to outside investors; similarly, users have incentives to "gold-
plate" the investment beyond the efficient level when outside investors cannot fully extract the surplus that
users derive from such goldplating.
18This issue is similar to the hold-up problem stressed by Williamson (1979) and further studied by Grossman-
Hart (1986) and Hart-Moore (1988).
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A similar analysis applies to an IOC which cannot commit in advance not to expropriate future
users. In contrast, an NDC cannot expropriate future members, who are therefore willing to





. We thus have:
Proposition 2 Suppose that: (i) prospective users must make a relation-specific investment in
order to use the technology; and (ii) the technology owner cannot commit to its future access
price. Then an IOC or an FDC fails to attract new members, whereas an NDC may still attract
new members and be viable if the investment cost is not too large.
Thus, while IOCs and FDCs may face a commitment problem and have problems attracting
new members, a non-discrimination charter (or more generally a charter that limits the feasible
discrimination) provides a commitment not to expropriate the specific investments made by the
future members.19
In our view, such considerations play an important role in the genesis of cooperatives.20
They may also explain why private property may voluntarily be turned into the public domain.
For example, the Visa and MasterCard associations were originally investor-owned.21 Turning
the systems into (basically) nondiscriminatory cooperatives enabled the corporation to offer a
credible commitment to other issuers and thereby to benefit from increased network externali-
ties. A similar credibility argument often underlies the release of formerly proprietary software
to form a coalition around a standard or to initiate an open source process.
19Of course, the credibility of such commitment depends in turn on the strength of the charter of the coop-
erative, and in particular on the conditions under which members may later on amend the non-discrimination
provisions of the charter.
20They may for example contribute to explain the successful creation of agriculture cooperatives in response
to the high prices charged by for-profit suppliers.
Of course, other, external elements may help cooperatives to get off the ground. For example, nonprofit
hospitals in the US have benefitted from charitable contributions. Favorable tax treatment (especially before
the Tax Reform Act of 1986) has also contributed to the development of cooperatives. Large R&D consortia often
receive seed money or subsidies from governments. For example, European Community Esprit and Eureka IT
funding programs in the 1980s contributed respectively to 50% and 35% of the costs of inter-firm R&D projects.
21Visa finds its origins in Bank of America’s proprietary system, and MasterCard in the merger of proprietary
systems owned by Wells Fargo Bank and Marine Midland Bank.
MasterCard and Visa recently returned to a for-profit status, even though they are still largely run like
associations for the time being.
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3.2 Contestability of upstream segment
Our natural monopoly model has assumed that the platform, regardless of its charter, is not
threatened by entry. Let us in contrast assume that the investment technology is widely avail-
able, and so a new institution may emerge, that threatens the established platform. We will
assume that, when confronted with two alternative offers, the young generation coordinates to
jointly take the offer that is best for its users (this is the “Pareto dominance” selection criterion
often used in network economics).
Because IOCs do not differ from FDCs under member homogeneity, we will focus on the
competition between the FDC and NDC forms. We consider the following timing. At each date
t:
(i) If the incumbent organizational form (the one that attracted the young users at date
t− 1) is an FDC, it makes an offer to the young generation. [If the incumbent platform is an
NDC, no offer is made since the NDC charter specifies how investment costs are to be shared.]
(ii) There is then free entry into both the NDC and FDC forms: The young generation can
decline the incumbent platform’s proposition and either form an NDC or join the FDC that
offers the most favorable deal.22
We will assume that at stage (ii) the young generation chooses the incumbent platform when
indifferent with the best of entrant platforms. We also assume that an incumbent platform that
does not succeed in attracting the young generation exits; because there is free entry, this
assumption is inconsequential. Finally, we will focus on Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPEs):
The utility offered to the young generation at stage (i) depends only on the nature of the
incumbent platform (NDC or FDC), and the utility offered by entrants is path independent.
Let Y ∗ denote the highest (present discounted) utility offered to the young by entrant
platforms at stage (ii), and O∗FDC and O
∗
NDC denote the old generation’s equilibrium utility
when it has joined an FDC or an NDC in the previous period.
22One can imagine for example that entrepreneurs set up FDCs, invest and demand entry fees. The literature
on backward integration studies similar alternatives in static frameworks; see for example Innes-Sexton (1994)
and the papers mentioned there.
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Lemma 3 Focusing on entry by FDCs involves no loss of generality.
Proof. Note first that O∗FDC ≥ θ, since an FDC can always turn down the next generation
by charging a sufficiently high entry price. By contrast, O∗NDC is equal to either θ or θ − I/2.
And so O∗FDC ≥ O∗NDC .
Because the young generation’s initial utility of joining an entrant platform is −I whether
the platform is an entrant NDC or an entrant FDC, the young generation is always better off
joining an FDC if it selects an entrant:
−I + δO∗FDC ≥ −I + δO∗NDC .
Let us now look for a stable (i.e., long-lived) organizational form. From the lemma, we know
that this stable form must offer to the young:
Y ∗ ≥ −I + δO∗FDC . (5)
• Fully discriminatory cooperative. If the incumbent platform is an FDC, then its offer is such
that (5) is satisfied with equality:








Y ∗FDC = 2δθ − I ≥ 0.
• Nondiscriminatory cooperative. An NDC is stable if





≥ −I + δO∗FDC = 2δθ − I.
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This condition is always strictly satisfied: the NDC is more attractive than an FDC.23
We thus conclude that both organizational forms are stable once they get going. However,
an FDC wins the initial competition, since, for the date-0 generation:





< Y 0FDC = Y
∗
FDC = −I + 2δθ.
In the case of an FDC all generations of users get the same share of the benefits generated by
the cooperative: Y 0FDC = Y
∗
FDC ; in contrast, in the case of an NDC the founders get a smaller
share of that surplus, at the benefit of future generations of users: Y 0NDC < Y ∗NDC . This is
why an NDC will keep going once it gets started (new generations of users prefer to join an
NDC rather than starting a new cooperative), but also why the first generation favors an FDC
statute:
Proposition 4 Both types of platforms keep going once they get started. However, FDCs are
more attractive entrants and thus win the initial competition.
More generally, FDCs constitute more robust platforms:
• Shocks. Suppose for example that, in each period, with some positive probability the in-
cumbent’s platform investment cost is very large, so that the platform stops investing (and
exits the following period), otherwise the cost is I as before; and, to fix ideas, suppose that
the investment cost is observed by the young before deciding which platform to join. It is easy
to check that the most attractive entrants are still FDCs: by joining an entrant, whatever its
organizational form, users get −I in the current period and θ in the following period when the
cost of investment turns out to be prohibitive. But as old users, when the cost of investment
does not turn out to be prohibitive they get again 2θ if they previously joined an FDC and only
θ − I/2 if they joined instead an NDC.24 Therefore, natural selection will lead to an FDC in
23Furthermore, it is a dominant strategy for the young generation to join the NDC as (1 + δ) (θ − I/2) is the
minimum it gets by joining the NDC for any continuation outcome.
24Denoting by λ the probability of a bad shock on the cost of investment, and by YFDC and OFDC the
expected present discounted utility of the young and the utility of the old when the cost of investment stays
equal to I, condition (5) becomes
YFDC ≥ −I + δ [(1− λ)OFDC + λθ] ,
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the long run. A similar argument applies to situations where, with some probability, investing
in the incumbent’s platform technology brings little benefit in the following period.
• Coordination and learning. Coordination failures (for example, with some probability, the
young generation does not coordinate in the current period on what is optimal for it) or learning
costs may also favor the emergence of FDCs. If for example the young generation must incur a
learning cost L, the benefit from joining an NDC becomes






In contrast, in the case of an (incumbent or entrant) FDC, the learning costs are partly absorbed
by the the old generation (or by the entrepreneur starting the entrant FDC): as before, the
young generation gets




FDC = (2θ − L− I) + δO∗FDC ,
we obtain
O∗FDC = 2θ − L
and
Y ∗FDC = 2δθ − I − δL.
In other words, while the young generation fully bears the costs of coordination or learning in
the case of an NDC (its utility is reduced by L), in the case of an FDC these costs are shared
with the old generation (the utility of the young generation is reduced by δL only), which can
tilt the balance in favor of FDCs.
leading to to Y ∗FDC = −I + δ [(1− λ)O∗FDC + λθ], while by construction
Y ∗FDC +O
∗
FDC = (2θ − I) + δ [(1− λ)OFDC + λθ] .
Thus O∗FDC = 2θ and
Y 0FDC = −I + δ [λθ + (1− λ) 2θ] > Y 0NDC = −I + δ
∙







Remark. This fragility of NDCs to entry by FDCs may remind the reader of the political
economy of pensions. Pay-as-you-go systems and FDCs are less favorable to the young (as
opposed to the old) than fully-funded-social-security systems and NDCs. As is well-known it is
quite difficult to move from a pay-as-you-go system to a fully-funded system while the reverse
is obviously easier.
4 Heterogeneous users and inclusiveness
4.1 Dynamics of membership
Allowing users to enjoy different benefits is interesting for two reasons. First, heterogeneity
introduces a distinction between viability and efficiency: an organizational form may support
investment, but be underinclusive and therefore inefficient; in contrast, with homogenous users,
viability always implied efficiency. Second, heterogeneity creates some differentiation between
the investor-owned corporation and the discriminatory cooperative.
Let us assume that, in a given generation, the agents’ gross surpluses are distributed accord-
ing to cumulative distribution F (θ) on [0,∞). We assume that the distribution is log concave:
f(θ)
1−F (θ) increases with θ.
• Investor-owned corporation. Let
θm = argmax {θ[1− F (θ)]}
denote the “monopoly cut-off”, that is the type of the marginal user of the technology when
the technology is marketed by an IOC.25 The monopoly profit is
V m =




25We assume that the IOC cannot discriminate among the users according to their age. Otherwise, the IOC
would offer nomember access at a low price, targeted to old users who have not joined in the previous period.
From standard intertemporal (Coasian) price discrimination theory, we know that this would discourage some
users (those with type only slightly above θm) from subscribing when they are young, which would lower the
profitability of the IOC: A policy of no discrimination between short- and long-term users allows the IOC to
commit to monopoly access charges. We will make the similar assumption for the NDC and the FDC.
Note in particular that this assumption understates the extent of free-riding in cooperatives as it eliminates
“footdragging” (the strategy adopted by some potential members of waiting until investment has been sunk to
adhere to the cooperative).
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We assume that an IOC is viable:
δπm > I. (6)
• Fully discriminatory cooperative. In each period t, given the number of old members 1 −
F (θt−1), the entry fee Et and the charge at+1 anticipated for the next period, users with a high
enough θ (θ ≥ θt, say) join the FDC while those with a lower θ do not; conversely, in the next
period, the access charge at+1 will be determined by the optimal entry policy set by the young
generation, and thus depends on the threshold θt; this threshold and the corresponding access
charge at are thus such that:
at +Et = (1 + δ) θt − δat+1 (θt) , (7)
where at+1 (θt) denotes the access fee generated by the young generation in the next period,
and
I = [1− F (θt−1)] at + [1− F (θt)] (at +Et) . (8)




subject to (7) and (8). Clearly, the value of the program, at (θt−1), satisfies
[1− F (θt−1)] at (θt−1) = min
θt
{I − [1− F (θt)] [(1 + δ) θt − δat+1 (θt)]}
= I −max
θt
{(1 + δ) [1− F (θt)] θt − δ [1− F (θt)] at+1 (θt)}
= R− (1 + δ)max
θt
{[1− F (θt)] θt} ,
where
R ≡ (1 + δ) I − δmax
θt+1
{[1− F (θt+1)] [(1 + δ) θt+1 − δat+2 (θt+1)]}
does not depend on θt. Generation t− 1 will thus choose θt so as to maximize [1− F (θt)] θt,
which leads to:26
θt = θm.
26This is achieved by setting a fixed fee Em and an access charge am such that am +Em = (1 + δ) θm − δam
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Except in the first period, the membership is the same as for an IOC and users with type
θ > θm get positive surplus (1 + δ)(θ − θm). The initial membership is however wider than





• Nondiscriminatory cooperative. In the steady state of an NDC, the marginal user’s type θNDC






The IOC is underinclusive relative to the NDC, since
θNDC < θm.
While the steady state outcome under an NDC is socially superior to the IOC outcome, there
may be serious transition problems like in the case of homogenous users. The first generation
bears the initial cost of investment but does not immediately benefit from the joint venture.
So the NDC may never get off the ground. It can get going at date 0 only if there exists a
sequence of marginal customers θ0, θ1, · · · , θt, · · · , and uniform access charges a0, a1, · · · , at, · · · ,
such that
a0[1− F (θ0)] = I,
at[1− F (θt−1) + 1− F (θt)] = I for all t ≥ 1,
and


















27θFDC0 is determined by
δθ0 [1− F (θ0)] = I + δ [I − [1− F (θm)] (Em + am)] ,
which leads to:
δ {θm [1− F (θm)]− θ0 [1− F (θ0)]} = V m,
and thus θFDC0 < θ
m whenever V m > 0.
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δθ0 = a0 + δa1,
(1 + δ)θt = at + δat+1 for all t ≥ 1.
The interpretation is as follows. If at date 0, agents with type θ ≥ θ0 “contribute” (pay a0),
they get nothing in period 0 but the venture gets started, and so they will be able to benefit
from the investment in period 1, provided they pay the access price a1. And so on.
We will say that a sequence Θ = (θ0, θ1, · · · ) is self-financing if for all t ≥ 1
(1 + δ)θt ≥
∙
1
1− F (θt−1) + 1− F (θt)
+
δ










1− F (θ0) + 1− F (θ1)
¸
.
That is, if at date t type θt is willing to join the venture provided all types above θt also
join, and at dates t − 1 and t + 1 types above θt−1 and θt+1, respectively, have joined and
will join the venture. If it is nonempty, the set of types θt satisfying this condition for given
θt−1 and θt+1, has a lowest element, and this lowest element is nondecreasing in θt−1 and θt+1.
In words, potential users are willing to become members at date t if the venture is already
bigger (θt−1 smaller), since a wide membership spreads the fixed cost over a larger number
of members (at = I/[1− F (θt−1) + 1− F (θt)]) and if it is expected that more users will join
later on (θt+1 smaller), since it reduces the anticipated level of assessments for the next period.
Appendix A shows that if sequences Θ = (θ0, θ1, · · · ) and Θ0 = (θ00, θ01, · · · ) are self-financing,
so is Θ
V
Θ0 = (min(θ0, θ00),min(θ1, θ
0
1), · · · ):





which thus Pareto-dominates (from the point of view of all generations)





converges towards θˆ∞ = θNDC.
A self-financing sequence may not exist. In particular, the above conditions imply
δ(θ0 − a1) [1− F (θ0)] = I.
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< θm [1− F (θm)] < I
δ
.
Proposition 6 Under user heterogeneity, the investor-owned corporation and the discrimina-
tory cooperative are viable if and only if condition (6) holds. They are then equally inclusive
except at the initial stage where the cooperative is more inclusive. The nondiscriminatory coop-
erative is more inclusive than the other two organizational forms, but is viable under a condition
that is stricter than (6).
4.2 Social optimality
Under heterogeneity, the FDC yields the monopoly membership level. On the other hand, the
NDC may not be viable. Let us now consider the Ramsey optimum, defined as the allocation











(1 + δ) (θ − θt) f (θ) dθ
i
s.t. δθ0 [1− F (θ0)]− I +
P
t>0 δ
t [(1 + δ) θt [1− F (θt)]− I] ≥ 0.
The maximand reflects the fact that for each generation the net surplus of the marginal user
θt is equal to zero and therefore the rent of type θ is (1 + δ) (θ − θt) for t ≥ 1 and δ (θ − θ0)
for t = 0. The budget constraint accounts for the equality between the marginal type’s gross
surplus, (1 + δ) θt, and his net intertemporal payment to the cooperative. Unsurprisingly the
Ramsey optimum in this stationary context is a constant cutoff, θt = θR; each type θ > θR then








in the first generation). From the budget constraint,








The following proposition is proved in Appendix B:
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Proposition 7 (i) The Ramsey optimal cooperative has a constant membership (θt = θR for
all t).
(ii) It is more inclusive than the fully discriminatory cooperative and the investor-owned
corporation but less inclusive than a steady state nondiscriminatory cooperative (assuming the
latter can get off the ground).
Comparison with public utility regulation. The Ramsey allocation can be achieved by a
leveraged public utility.28 Two preliminary remarks are in order. First, we will adopt an ideal-
ized (“Ramsey-Boiteux”) perspective on public utilities; we deliberately ignore the inefficiencies
attached to this form of regulation and only aim at a better conceptual understanding of the
result obtained above. Second, we have argued that cooperatives have little or no access to
external financing because users can easily pay themselves dividends in kind. Public utilities
are (highly) leveraged consumer cooperatives. The difference is that public utilities are subject
to intensive regulation and to the legal obligation, enforced by courts, to provide investors with
a fair rate of return.
Consider thus a regulated NDC with access to debt financing. Leverage allows the NDC to
get off the ground by spreading the initial cost across generations. Suppose for example that
the cooperative is allowed to impute a fair rate of return (1/δ−1) on nondepreciated investment
to the current access price. That is, since investments are fully depreciated after two periods,
the NDC sets a0 = 0 and, at each date t ≥ 1, an access charge at satisfying




This rate-of-return regulation allows the venture to lever on a permanent basis (borrow I at
each date, and reimburse I/δ at the following date). This policy corresponds to the celebrated
"golden rule" that Keynes and Pigou designed as a constraint on leverage for country or mu-
28Alternatively, the Ramsey optimum can be achieved by setting an entry fee Et = 2 (1 + δ) θR (E0 = 2δθR
for the first generation) and by subsidizing usage: at = −θR . Such a subsidy may trigger moral hazard problems
when the input can be used in variable proportions. In order to avoid these problems and, more generally, to
avoid usage distortions, a two-part usage tariff should be used — the subsidy should then be applied to the fixed
part.
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nicipality indebtness, according to which only capital, and no current, expenditures could be
financed through debt.
>From a financial viewpoint, everything is as if the investment were sunk at the date at
which it bears fruits; and so the outcome is then the Ramsey steady state outcome, characterized
by θt = θR for every t ≥ 0 and at = aR = θR for t ≥ 1.
5 Downstream competition and foreclosure
We have so far assumed that new members do not reduce the value of membership for existing
members. This is no longer so if they compete on the same product market. One may therefore
wonder whether imposing open access gives rise to a “deregulatory taking.” In the case of
cooperatives, though, there are stricto sensu no shareholders whose investments in an essential
input are expropriated through the increase in competition. Hence, a simple-minded analogy
is not warranted and we must conduct a separate analysis.
We assume now that investing I in any given period leads to the development of a new
technological generation in the following period. More precisely, and to keep the analysis simple,
we will assume that in each period t:
• previous generations of the technology are freely available, regardless of the history of the
industry;
• by contrast, generation-t of the technology is available only if investment I was sunk in
period t− 1.
We will assume that competition among the users of the previous generations of the tech-
nology dissipate their profits. In contrast, the latest generation generates additional surplus and
positive profits, which we assume to be stationary over time.29 We will assume that increasing
29This supposes some separability in consumers’ preferences. Consider for example a standard discrete choice
model where: (i) each household h is willing to buy one unit and obtain a net surplus
ut + θhi − pi
when buying from a firm i that has access to generation t; (ii) firms produce at no cost, say, whereas the θhi
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the number n of users of the latest generation decreases the per-firm profit, π (n), whereas
the aggregate profit, Π (n) = nπ (n), is concave and maximal for a finite number of users, nΠ,
and total welfare, W (n), is quasi-concave and such that W 0 (n) > 0 whenever Π0 (n) ≥ 0. The
latter assumption reflects competition authorities’ traditional concern about cooperatives being
underinclusive.30
There is an infinite number of potential users; for simplicity we will treat the number n
of actual users as a continuous variable, but nothing hinges on this. Also, for expositional
simplicity we will now assume that users are infinitely lived, although the analysis would be





















We will moreover assume that the developers of the latest technological generation have an
(arbitrarily small) timing advantage for developing the next generation; thus, if a corporation
or a cooperative has developed the generation-t technology at date t, then if it wishes so it
can preempt and thus discourage any other potential developer from investing in the next
generation.
Membership fees take the form of a fixed payment a, and thus have no direct impact on
are drawn independently from a continuous distribution over (−∞, 0]. At date t, perfect competition among
the users of the previous generations yields a net surplus (gross of θ) ut−1. Competition among the n firms
that have access to the up-to-date technology thus generates profits and welfare increase that depend only on
n and ut − ut−1. If we further assume that ut − ut−1 remain constant over time, then π (n) and W (n) are also
time-independant.
30See e.g. Rey-Tirole (2007) for a survey of the recent literature and a general discussion on vertical foreclosure.
31Given the concavity of Π (.), condition (10) implies that duplicating the investment is a fortiori not profitable
when more than nΠ firms are already using the new technology, since:
∂
∂n




Π00 (x) dx < 0.
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prices, welfare and (gross) profits. This rules out the potential use of membership fees as a
"collusive device" designed to maintain prices above the competitive level.32
As earlier, we will analyze the following institutions:
Investor owned corporation (IOC). If it invests in period t, the IOC owns the generation-t
technology at date t and licenses it at access charge at.
Nondiscriminatory cooperative (NDC). If the NDC has invested in the previous period, it
owns the generation-t technology but any firm can join (or stay in) the cooperative and use
that technology. In each period, current members first decide whether to invest in the next
generation of the technology, and set the access charge at so as to cover the costs; then, they
decide whether to stay and any other firm can join the NDC and, for the same amount at, use
the generation-t technology.
Fully discriminatory cooperative (FDC). As before, we will formalize discrimination as the
existence of an entry fee Et chosen by established members and to be paid by new members,
in addition to the access charge at. The governance is the same as for an NDC, except that
current members set the entry fee as well as the access charge.
Before analyzing these institutions, it is useful to identify the social optimum.
5.1 Social optimum
In a first-best world, the technology should be made available to as many users as possible;
however, this would dissipate profits and would not allow technology developers to recoup their
investment. Absent any subsidy from third parties, the second-best number of users should
32Members could otherwise maintain high prices (even at the monopoly level) by inflating the usage price
charged for the input supplied by the cooperative and sharing the proceeds through dividends, lower entry or
franchise fees, in-kind benefits, etc. Competition authorities are of course aware of this possibility and may
intervene.
More generally, we assume that the cooperative is not a front for a cartel suppressing competition. There is
a wide consensus in the law and economics literature (Baker (1993), Carlton-Salop (1996), Chang et al. (1998))
that joint ventures should not facilitate collusion, implement naked price fixing, limit output, prevent offerings
of new products, exclude low-cost competitors, and so forth.
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δt [δΠ (nt)− I] ≥ 0
.
This optimal number of users is then stationary33 and thus equal to the Ramsey value, nR,which






In particular, it is here desirable to allowmore users than what is privately optimal: the viability
condition (9) implies nR > nΠ.
5.2 Private investment
We now study the various organizational forms’ incentives to invest. Intuitively, open access
policy can discourage investment by depriving investors from an appropriate return. Conversely,
closed access policies encourage investment by protecting these returns, but they may exces-
sively restrict access, compared with what would be socially desirable.
• Investor-owned corporation. An IOC can choose the number of users and extract their profits





δt [δΠ (nt)− I] ,
which leads to
nIOC = nΠ.
That is, the IOC excessively limits access to the technology in order to avoid profit dissipation.
• Fully discriminatory cooperative. The founders of an FDC can again replicate the outcome
of an IOC: by setting the entry fee at a prohibitive level, they can discourage any further entry
33Letting μ denote the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the budget constraint, the first-order condition
yields
W 0 (nt) + μΠ0 (nt) ,
which implies that nt is constant over time.
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and thus implement a "closed access" policy which shields them from additional competitive





− I/nΠ, nFDC ≡ nΠ founding members can secure and share among themselves the
maximal industry profit; the access fee at can then be used to share the cost of the investment
among them: at = aFDC ≡ I/nΠ.
• Nondiscriminatory cooperative. Consider now the case of an NDC. If the cooperative invested
at date t− 1, then at date t users join or stay in the cooperative as long as their profit, π (.),
exceeds the access charge at. Therefore, the total number of members, nt, satisfies:
π (nt) = at,
and thus the cooperative’s members will make zero profit. But then, at date t− 1 the cooper-
ative’s members, anticipating that their will obtain no profit in the following period, whether
they stay in the cooperative or not, do not invest.
We thus have:
Proposition 8 (i) The "open access" characteristic of NDCs discourages their members from
investing in the technology.
(ii) IOCs and FDCs both result in an "closed access" policy that encourages investment but
excessively restricts access to the technology.
(iii) Total welfare is higher for IOCs and FDCs than for NDCs, and is suboptimal.
5.3 Access holidays, leverage and the golden rule
In order to get closer to the social optimum, regulators can either constrain the exercise of
market power by IOCs and FDCs, or allow some investment protection in the case of NDCs.
Consider first the case of an FDC (the analysis would be similar for an IOC). In the absence
of any regulatory intervention, the cooperative would invest in the technology but would restrict
access beyond what is needed to recoup the investment; potential solutions to this problem thus
involve some form of mandatory access, e.g. by imposing additional licenses or by putting a
cap on the entry fee. Doing so amounts to regulating directly or indirectly the return on
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investment,34 and thus involves the usual issues (access to the relevant information on costs
and benefits, commitment problems, and so forth) attached to such "heavy-handed" regulation.
Consider next the case of an NDC. Absent any remedy, there would be excessive access if
the investment was made, which in turn deters investment. Remedies must therefore at least
partially protect the incumbent members from competitive pressure. A first series of measures
consist in introducing a dose of discrimination, e.g. through limited entry fees or any other
mechanisms that discriminates between new users and incumbent ones. This, in effect, makes
the cooperative more similar to an FDC.
Leverage. One possibility consists in allowing some leverage. Suppose for example that, in
each period, the cooperative is allowed to borrow up to a maximal debt level D¯, to be repaid
in the following period. At date t, given the debt Dt−1 contracted in the previous period and
the current number of members nt, contracting debt Dt leads to an access charge at such that:




The cooperative thus always borrows as much as possible (i.e., Dt = D¯), in order to reduce the
current access price and pass the burden on to future members.
As before, at each date the cooperative members anticipate that, due to free entry, they will
make zero profit in the following period whether they stay in the cooperative or not. Therefore,
in the initial period, in which no technological advantage can be obtained, the access fee must
be non-positive, which in turn implies that the debt level must cover the full cost of the
investment: D ≥ I. Conversely, allowing the NDC to be fully leveraged (this is the golden rule
already discussed in Section 4.2) enables its founding members to break even. Indeed, if the
cooperative systematically borrows D¯ = I to cover the investment cost, in the starting period



















/nR and attract nR users.
34While we focus here on yes/no investment decisions, more generally the regulated return should provide
adequate incentives to invest to the desirable level.
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More generally, borrowing D¯ leads to an access fee such that:
δna = δnπ (n) = δΠ (n) = δI + (1− δ) D¯.
Therefore, allowing the cooperative to be more than fully leveraged would lead to too few users:
this would yield δΠ (n) > I, and thus n < nR. It is therefore optimal to allow the NDC to
borrow up to, but no more than the amount of its investment.35
Access holiday. Another form of protection consists in granting limited "access holidays".
Suppose for example that investment is lumpy: it takes place at the beginning of a "period",
which is subdivided into subperiods (an infinite number for expositional simplicity). Suppose
further that n founding members are allowed to deny access during a fraction α of each period,
while during the remaining fraction 1− α of the period, any additional user can pay the fixed
access charge a and enjoy the profit π (.). If the cooperative gets started, in each of the following
periods the access charge a (during and outside access holidays) and the number of entrants,
m (α), then satisfy
π (n+m) = a,
and
[αn+ (1− α) (n+m)] a = I,
and thus:
[n+ (1− α)m]π (n+m) = I.
The limit case α = 1 corresponds to closed access and thus replicates the outcome of an IOC or
FDC. Conversely, the limit case α = 0 corresponds to open access and does not allow to recoup
members the investment cost; the length of the access holiday should thus be at least sufficient
to allow the founding members to recoup their investment. In addition, limiting the duration
35It might be socially desirable to restrict the number of users below the Ramsey level when there are
significant economies of scale or scope (e.g., large set-up costs); this would arise here if W (n) were maximal




> I/δ. It would then be desirable to allow the NDC to be more than fully
leveraged; the initial access fee would then be negative (that is, lower than the operating cost), allowing in effect
the founding members to cover their investment cost through the profit generated by future use. However, as









then requires detailed information on costs and benefits as well as on the discount rate.
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of the access holiday (i.e., reducing α) reduces the number of additional users. Indeed, letting
ϕ (m,α) denote the left-hand side of the above equation, we have:
∂ϕ
∂α




= [n+ (1− α)m]π0 (n+m) + (1− α)π (n+m)
= (1− α)Π0 (n+m) + nπ0 (n+m) ,
where the second term is negative and the first term is also negative in the relevant range (i.e.,
for n+m > nΠ); therefore:






The optimal policy thus also involves a trade-off between granting access to more users, or for
a longer period of time.
Let us note, though, that access holidays:
• require much more information than the golden rule,
• imply a non-stationary level of market power, and therefore do not implement the socially
optimal policy.
6 Conclusion
Potential members knocking at the door of a successful joint venture always feel slighted when
offered discriminatory treatment or being excluded altogether. This paper has analyzed their
concern and identified two potential sources of inefficiency arising from discriminatory treat-
ment. The first is that, in a natural monopoly situation, incumbent members have an incentive
to exploit their monopoly power; the resulting taxation of new membership leads to underin-
clusiveness (section 4). The second source of inefficiency is due to the incumbents’ incentive to
restrict entry into their downstream markets by new players (section 5).
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This suggests that, in natural monopoly situations,36 joint ventures ought to be viewed
as “essential facilities” and forced to treat users equally. Our analysis however calls for some
caution, at least at a general level. Nondiscriminatory cooperatives are highly fragile institu-
tions. For one thing, they imply that new members free ride on the investment of established
members (had we introduced uncertainty, free riding might have been even more of an issue
as potential members could join the joint venture only if it turns successful). This induces
underinvestment (the horizon problem) or even prevents the cooperative from getting off the
ground. Furthermore, even if it is viable on a stand-alone basis, the nondiscriminatory cooper-
ative is vulnerable to attacks by discriminatory cooperatives or by for-profits, which can lure
potential members through the promise of future natural monopoly profits. For another thing,
in a situation in which new members compete with established ones on the product market, the
nondiscriminatory cooperative may be reluctant to levy assessments that reduce the latter’s
current profit in order to finance an innovation whose benefits will be competed away. While
the new members’ concerns are real, these aspects should be seriously taken into account be-
fore forcing open access to a joint venture. In a nutshell, open access policies involve a familiar
Schumpeterian tradeoff between static efficiency and innovation. Last, future research should
aim at helping policymakers to define an “organizationally neutral” competition policy.37 The
treatment of access to cooperatives should be consistent with the essential facilities doctrine
applied to investor-owned corporations, and not tilt the level-playing field in favor of a specific
organizational form.
36If returns to scale are moderate beyond some minimal scale, facilities duplication may substitute favorably
for a necessarily imperfect regulation of access. This point was for example made forcefully by Advocate General
Jacobs in Oscar Bronner vs Mediaprint (European Court of Justice 1998). Mediaprint (with downstream
market share of 47%) operated its own newspaper delivery system in Austria, and refused to give access to a
competing newspaper, Der Standard (market share 3.6%), on the same terms as a noncompeting, independent
newspaper that used the delivery system.The Advocate General expressed his concerns that an access policy,
while encouraging competition in the short run, would kill incentives for small newpapers to develop their own
delivery system (possibly cooperatively) and thereby prevent facilities-based competition in the long term.
37The organizational neutrality problem has been recognized at least since Associated Press (Associated
Press II, 326 US 1943). The US Supreme Court affirmed a lower court decision and sided with the government
challenge of AP’s bylaws. Dissenting Justices however noted that AP’s two proprietary competitors, United
Press and International News Service, were able to enforce unchallenged similar restraints as those implied by
AP’s bylaws in their contracts with subscribers.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 5
Consider two self-financing sequences Θ1 = (θ10, θ
1
1, · · · ) and Θ2 = (θ20, θ21, · · · ); by definition,







1− F (θi0) + 1− F (θi1)
¸
(Ci0)
and for t = 1, 2, ...
(1 + δ)θit ≥
∙
1
1− F (θit−1) + 1− F (θit)
+
δ
1− F (θit) + 1− F (θit+1)
¸
I. (Cit)
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1), · · ·
¢
is self-financing. This, in turn, ensures that if there exists a self-financing sequence, there exists




. Furthermore, this smallest self-financing
sequence must be such that all constraints are binding (otherwise, it would be possible to reduce







1− F (θ0) + 1− F (θ1)
¸
(C0)
and for all t > 1
(1 + δ)θt =
∙
1
1− F (θt−1) + 1− F (θt)
+
δ




We now show that the sequence Θˆ satisfies θˆt ≥ θˆt+1. Suppose that it is not the case and
define τ as the first date t such that θˆt < θˆt+1. Consider the sequence Θ0 such that θ0t = θˆt for
t ≤ τ , θ0τ+1 = θˆτ , and θ0t = θˆt−1 for t ≥ τ + 1. By construction, this sequence satisfies (Ct)
for any t ≤ τ − 1 (the condition (Ct) is then unchanged) and for t ≥ τ + 2 (the new condition
(C 0t) then corresponds to the previous condition (Ct)). Furthermore, it satisfies (for the sake of
presentation, we suppose τ > 0, but the reader can check that the argument applies as well to
the case τ = 0):
(1 + δ)θ0τ = (1 + δ)θˆτ =
"
1
1− F (θˆτ−1) + 1− F (θˆτ)
+
δ






1− F (θˆτ−1) + 1− F (θˆτ)
+
δ






1− F (θ0τ−1) + 1− F (θ0τ)
+
δ
1− F (θ0τ) + 1− F (θ0τ+1)
¸
I, (C 0τ)
where the inequality derives from θˆτ < θˆτ+1, and
(1 + δ)θ0τ+1 = (1 + δ)θˆτ =
"
1
1− F (θˆτ−1) + 1− F (θˆτ )
+
δ






1− F (θˆτ ) + 1− F (θˆτ )
+
δ






1− F (θ0τ ) + 1− F (θ0τ+1)
+
δ
1− F (θ0τ+1) + 1− F (θ0τ+2)
¸
I, (C 0τ+1)
whereas the inequality stems from θˆτ−1 ≥ θˆτ . It follows that the sequence Θ0 is self-financing;
but then, Θˆ0 = Θˆ
V
Θ0 is also self-financing and satisfies θˆ
0
t ≤ θˆt for any t and θˆ
0
τ+1 = θˆτ < θˆτ+1,
so that Θˆ was not the smallest self-financing sequence.
Next, we show that the sequence satisfies θˆt > θˆt+1. Suppose that it is not the case. Given
the above argument, θˆt must therefore remain constant over several periods. Define τ as the
first date t such that θˆt = θˆt+1 and T as the first date t > τ such that θˆt < θˆτ . Consider the
sequence Θ0 such that θ0t = θˆt for t ≤ τ and θ0t = θˆt+T−τ−1 for t ≥ τ+1. As before, this sequence
satisfies (Ct) for any t ≤ τ − 1 (the condition (Ct) is again unchanged) and for t ≥ τ + 2 (the
new condition (C 0t) then corresponds to the previous condition (Ct+T−τ−1)). Furthermore, it
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satisfies (assuming again τ > 0 for the sake of presentation):
(1 + δ)θ0τ = (1 + δ)θˆτ ≥
∙
1
1− F (θ0τ−1) + 1− F (θ0τ)
+
δ






1− F (θˆτ−1) + 1− F (θˆτ )
+
δ
1− F (θˆτ ) + 1− F (θˆT )
#
I, (C 0τ)
(1 + δ)θ0τ+1 = (1 + δ)θˆT ≥
∙
1
1− F (θ0τ) + 1− F (θ0τ+1)
+
δ






1− F (θˆτ) + 1− F (θˆT )
+
δ
1− F (θˆT ) + 1− F (θˆT+1)
#
I, (C 0τ+1)
where the first inequality derives from (Cτ ) and θˆτ+1 = θˆτ > θˆT , whereas the second inequality
stems from (CT ) and θˆT−1 = θˆτ . Therefore, Θ0 and Θˆ0 = Θˆ
V
Θ0 are both self-financing
sequences; but θˆ
0
t ≤ θˆt for any t and θˆ
0
τ+1 = θˆT < θˆτ+1, so that Θˆ was not the smallest
self-financing sequence.
The smallest sequence Θˆ is thus strictly decreasing over time. Since it is bounded below by
θ = 0, it converges towards a value θˆ∞ which, by continuity, must satisfy
(1 + δ)θˆ∞ =
"
1
1− F (θˆ∞) + 1− F (θˆ∞)
+
δ









Hence, θˆ∞ = θ∗.
B Proof of Proposition 7
(i) The concavity of the revenue function θ [1− F (θ)] ensures that the Ramsey program, too,
is concave. Denoting by λ the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint, for







and thus θt must be constant, since the left-hand side is increasing.
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(ii) The budget constraint then ensures that θR is the lowest root of
0 = δθ [1− F (θ)]− I +
X
t>0






δt (1 + δ)
#


















Hence θR lies between θNDC (the smallest root of 2θ [1− F (θ)] = I < Iδ ) and θ
m (which
maximizes θ [1− F (θ)]).
39
